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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXPRESS
COMPANY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant1

Case
No. 8659

vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION and THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is taken from the order of the District Court
for Salt Lake County, sustaining the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the State Tax Commission, on the ground that the complaint does not contain sufficient facts to constitute a basis for
relief as prayed. There was no formal appearance by the
State of Utah, but the matter is presented to this court as though
the State of Utah had also filed the Motion to dismiss, and
the State of Utah is designated as Respondent herein. No
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question of parties has been raised and it will not be considered
material unless raised by this court.
The complaint alleges, in effect, that a Trustee held title
to certain motor vehicle equipment in the State of Utah for
the purpose of leasing it to two corporations, Orange Transportation Company, an Idaho corporation, and Collett Tank
Lines, a Utah corporation. These two corporations went out
of business by selling all of their capital stock to the plaintiff
and as part of the transaction the Trustee sold the motor vehicle
equipment to the plaintiff. This equipment consisted of trucks
and tractors, and included also semi-trailers. The State Tax
Commission refused to register any of this equipment until
the sales tax was paid by the plaintiff, which was the purchaser.
The plaintiff, therefore, paid under protest on the 15th day
of January, 1957, assessed tax in the amount of $8,174.83 which
was the combined tax on the sale price of the motor vehicle
tractors, the motor vehicle trucks and the semi-trailers which
are used in connection with tractors. The item of $8,174.83
is not broken down as to the various classes of equipment sold.
The complaint alleges that the sellers of the equipment
were not engaged in the business of selling property to users
or consumers and that it was not an isolated or occasional sale
by a retailer as defined in Section 59-15-2 (E) U.C.A. 1953,
and alleges that none of the sellers was engaged in a regularly
organized retail business within the meaning of that section.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The Utah Sales Tax Act is not applicable to sales by

persons other than retailers, as defined in the Statute.
4
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2. Semi-trailers, as used by a motor carrier of property are

not taxable under the Sales Tax Act when sold in occasional or
isolated transactions.
3. Amendment of the definition and collection sections
of the Sales Tax Act does not alter the scope of the tax.
4. An interpretation of the Statute singling out motor
vehicles for taxation when sold in isolated or occasional transactions would be unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT
1. The Utah Sales Tax Act is not applicable to sales by
persons other than retailers, as defined in the Statute.

Section 59-14-4 U.C.A. is the section of the Utah Code
which levies what is referred to as the Sales Tax. This section
reads:
"there is levied ... (a) A tax upon every retail sale
of tangible personal property made within the State
of Utah ... "
The definition section of Chapter 15 ( 59-15-2) defines
"retail sale" as "every sale within the State of Utah by a
retailer . . . to a user or consumer." A "retailer" is defined as
"a person doing regularly organized retail business in tangible
personal property, known to the public as such and selling to
the user or consumer and not for resale." Under no stretch
of the imagination does the term "retailer" include one engaging in a transaction of the nature here involved, that is, the
sale of rolling stock by one carrier to another as part of the
sale of the business. The definitional section referred to says,

5
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"that no sale of a motor vehicle shall be deemed isolated
or occasional for the purposes of this act." The effect of this
language is to treat the sales of motor vehicles as "usual"
or "regular" instead of "isolated" or "occasional." Then,
assuming that the sales of motor vehicles are usual, or regular,
does that make the seller in this case a ''retailer''? (''Retail
sale' means every sale ... by a retailer.") By no means does
this follow. The seller in this case was not "doing a regularly
organized retail business" of selling trucks, or of selling any
other commodity. The seller was not "known to the public
as such." It follows that no "retail sale" was involved in the
purchase of trucks by the appellant in this case, and Section
59-15-4 U.C.A. levies a tax "upon every retail sale." Therefore, the act of the respondent was unauthorized in compelling
payment of a tax by the appellant. Even if the legislative
intent could be clearly shown, and it cannot, it shouldn't be
used to go against plain terms of the statute to reach transactions upon which no tax is levied.
To be sure, there is some question or doubt as to the
purpose of the words in the definitional Section of 59-15-2
referring to isolated or occasional sales of motor vehicles, but
the clear import of the language in the section levying a tax
(59-15-4) and the correlative definitional Section (59-15-2)
is not to include taxes such as that to the appellant. The United
States Supreme Court in the Gould case stated a rule which
has become almost axiomatic:
··In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is
the established rule not to extend their provisions by
implication, beyond the clear import of the language
used, or to enlarge their operation so as to embrace

6
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matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt
they are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the citizen."
(Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 62 L. Ed. 211, 38
S. Ct. 53; see generally, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 293 and cases there cited.)
Even if it be said that the clear intention of the legislature
is to raise revenue by taxing the sale of motor vehicles, effect
of the language used, as we have seen, is to tax only retail
sales and the courts should not adopt a strained construction
m order to put into effect what may be said, by the collectors
of the tax, to be the intention of the legislature. Crawford
in his text, Statutory Construction, points up this rule of Construction as it applies to sales taxes in these words:
"Naturally, those laws which impose a tax on sales,
being tax laws, are subject to a strict construction in
accord with tax statutes generally. In other words, a
sales tax statute must be strictly construed in considering its coverage, and no strained construction may be
indulged in against the taxpayer simply because of the
apparent purpose to raise needed revenue ... " (p.
738).
In Tennessee a case arose which is analgous in many
ways to the case at bar. Both cases involve statutory construction of a statute which though containing certain terms which
might include the taxpayer, has controlling language which
clearly does not include the taxpayer. In the Tennessee case
(State v. McLemore, 290 S.W. 386), the State sought to hold
that certain compulsory insurance was applicable to the automobile of the taxpayer who operated the automobile for hire,
using a fixed stand, charging fares proportional to the haul

7
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and the number of passengers in each case, but not operating
between fixed termini or over a regular route. The court said:
"The caption is broad, covering all 'motor vehicles
... for hire, 'and the word 'taxicab' is given a definition practically as broad, and it may be plausibly contended that the protection sought to be provided
might fairly be so extended, but the language of section 2 is definitely limited. 'It shall be unlawful for
any person . . . to operate any motor vehicle . . . for
hire, between fixed termini, without executing bond
or providing insurance,' etc. This is the controlling
language of the act. The broad terms of the caption
and the references to taxicabs, contained in the body
of the act, fairly suggest a possible original purpose
to enact legislation which would apply to all motor
vehicles driven for hire, whether strictly taxicabs or
not (except when coming under a municipal ordinance
having similar requirements) ; but the manifest ambiguity and confusion in the frame and language of the
act as it now appears indicates restrictive changes inartificially made before final passage.
11

However this may be, we find the language of the
act heretofore quoted declaring rwhat shall be unlawful'
reasonably clear (emphasis added.) While in arriving
at the intent, which is always important, the apparent
general purpose of legislation may be considered, 'it
is also a settled rule of interpretation in this state,' as
said by Mr. Justice Lansden in Plow Co. v. Hays, 125
Tenn. 155, 140 S.W. 1069, 'that statutes levying taxes
or duties upon citizens will not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used,
nor will their operation be enlarged so as to embrace
matters not specifically pointed out, although standing
upon close analogy ... Burdens are not to be imposed
beyond what the statute expressly imports.' "

In the case just cited, words were used by the legislature
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which indicated a certain intent, but which the court found
negatived by express and controlling language. In the case at
bar, too, there is an indication of a possible legislative intent
regarding motor vehicles, which we have seen, however, is
negatived by the express and controlling language taxing
retail sales by retailers, which language does not include the
appellants.
An analysis of the definition section from a grammatical
point of view may be helpful. Section 59-15-4 imposes an excise
tax "upon every retail sale of tangible personal property."
Then Section 59-15-2 (e) defines the term "retailer" as a person
conducting "a regularly organized retail business in tangible
personal property." Then the latter half of that subsection
defines the term "retail sale." This definition is analyzed as
follows:
RETAIL SALE:
I. Sale by retailer or wholesaler to user or consumer.

(a) Wholesale sales excluded
(b) Exempted sales excluded
(c) Isolated or occasional sales (by persons not regularly engaged in business) excluded
(d) Seasonal sales and agricultural sales excluded
(1) Provided no sale of motor vericle is isolated
or occasional.
The last clause of subsection 59-15-2 ( 2) states: "but the
term 'retail sale' is not intended to include isolated nor occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in business .

9
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provided, however, that no sale of a motor vehicle shall be
deemed isolated or occasional for the purposes of this act."
This clause is separated from the clause defining retail sale
by a semicolon.
It is submitted that this clause excluding "isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in businessn
from the definition of "retail sale" is merely a reiteration (in
the negative) of the first clause of this subsection which states,
"the term 'retailer' means a person doing a regularly organized
retail business ... " The sellers here were not in the business
of selling to the user or consumer and their isolated or occa5ional sales were therefore excluded both generally and specifically.

The proviso part of the last clause of subsection 59-152 (e) , ''sale of a motor vehicle shall not be deemed isolated
or occasional," was obviously meant to limit only the sales
excluded from the term "retail sale." This is obvious from a
grammatical standpoint in that this part is separated from the
last clause by a comma, while the exclusionary clause is separated from the definition of a retail sale by a semicolon. This
mterpretation is obvious from a sense, or meaning standpoint,
in that the clause speaks of isolated or occasional sales, and
the proviso shows what shall not be deemed isolated or occasional.
Thus, while upon first reading it might appear that any
sale of a motor vehicle is a retail sale subject to a sales tax, it
can be seen upon analyzing the subsection, both from a grammatical and a meaning standpoint, that there must be a sale

10
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by a person doing a regularly organized business of selling
to the user or consumer in order to constitute a "retail sale."
It is clear that the sale of a motor vehicle cannot be
deemed isolated or occasional. But the fact that a sale is not
isolated or occasional does not make it subject to the sales tax
imposed by Section 59-15-4. There still must be a sale by a
retailer to a user or consumer.

The meaning of the phrase "isolated or occasional sales"
when applied to persons who are regularly engaged in business
must be that sales by such persons are covered even though
they involve commodities not regularly dealt in. For example,
jf a regular retailer of dry goods gets a special deal on electrical
appliances and sells that one shipment out, it would be in the
nature of isolated or occasional sales, but would still be
covered. Or, if a sporting goods house orders a large inboard
motor boat on special purchase, that would be an isolated or
occasional sale, but would still be covered, because it is within
the volume of business done by a regularly organized retailer.
If such a retailer sold his fixtures and bought new fixtures for
his store, it would appear to be an occasional sale, but would
still be covered. And, likewise, if a grocery store which makes
deliveries sells its delivery truck, that would appear to be an
isolated or occasional sale and would be subject to the act.
And the definition states, specifically, that no sale of a motor
vehicle shall be considered an isolated or occasional sale,
without looking any further into the comparison of that transaction with other regular transactions of the person making
the sale. But there still is no modification of the application
of the act to retailers only, and to retail sales only, and the sale
here involved was not by a retailer and was not a retail sale.

11
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For courts consciously or unconsciously to ignore the wording of a statute in order to put into effect what they conceive
to be the legislative intent, at times might prove a service to
the legislature and the community from a nearsighted point
of view. But in the long run a grave disservice would be
perpetrated on the judicial and the legislative systems, and
thus to the community. Legislative enactments could easily become a mockery were courts to infer anything they might
conceive of as the intention of the legislature, irrespective
of the wording of the enactment.
·'Where there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning
of a revenue statute it should be resolved in favor of
those taxed." 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 293.
Cases: Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 62 L. Ed. 211,
38 S. Ct. 53 ( 1915); Stephens v. Glander, 151 Ohio
St. 62, 84 N. E. 2d 279 (1949); Campana Corp. v.
Cmr. 210 F 2d 897 (1954); Allen v. Atlanta lvietallic
Casket Co., 197 F 2d 460 ( 1952); Masonite Corp. v.
Fly, 194 F 2d 257 (1952); Peck v. State, 216 P 2d
132 (1950); Walgreen Co. v. Gross Inc. Tax Div.,
75 N. E. 2d 784 ( 1947); Langford v. Aten, 39 N. W.
2d 82 (1949); Salomon v. Jersey City, 97 A 2d 405
( 19 53) ; School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Frankford
Grocery Co., 103 A 2d 738 ( 1954); Bott v. Commonwealth, 48 S. E. 2d 235 (1948).
Revzan v. Nudelman, 18 N. E. 2d. 219 (Illinois): This
case involved a sales tax law and was decided in favor of the
taxpayer by subjecting the words "use" and "consumption" to
their restrictive meaning of "use up" or "exhaust." The court
said:
··In the first place, it must be remembered that the
act imposes a tax only upon persons engaged in the
business of selling at retail. No other class is included

12
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in its provisions, either expressly or by necessary implications. Defendants insist that the sole leather and
rubber heels sold by plaintiffs to repairmen are retail
sales, on the theory that such materials are used or
consumed by the repairman. This brings us to a consideration of the meaning of the terms: 'for use or
consumption.' In construing a statute, 'it is fundamental that taxing laws must be strictly construed. They
are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear
import of the language used. In case of doubt, they
are construed most strongly against the government and
in favor of the taxpayer. Strict construction does not
require that the words be given the narrowest meaning
of which they are susceptible, and words of the act
are to be given their full meaning."
Bedford v. Johnson, 78 P. 2d, 373 (Colo.):
"This court has repeatedly held that statutes levying
taxes or duties upon citizens will not be extended by
implication beyond the clear import of the language
used, nor will their operation be enlarged so as to
embrace matters not specifically pointed out, although
standing upon a close analogy, and all questions of
doubt will be resolved against the government and in
favor of the citizen, and because burdens are not to
be imposed beyond what the statute expressly imports."
This case was one where the court refused to regard automobile parking lots as falling within the scope of a statute
which imposed a tax on general warehouse storage establishments.
Doran v. Crenshaw (Tenn.) 61 S. W. 2d, 469: Held that
the tax under the heading of "Florists," imposing a tax upon
each person dealing in cut flowers or potted plants, conducting
the business of a florist from a regular place of business, and
1~
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each person selling cut flowers, shrubs, or potted plants on the
streets or at other places outside a regular store, did not include
a horticulturist engaged in the operation of a nursery and
greenhouse on his land at 1732 Felix Avenue where he grows
from the soil various kinds of flowering and perennial plants
and shrubs, which he sells to dealers and the public generally:
·'This language so limited cannot be extended by implication
to embrace a producer of plants and flowers. To do so would
be to reach beyond the clear import of the language used ... "
It is to be concluded from the foregoing that the respondent unlawfully imposed a tax on the appellants with respect
to the purchaser of the motor vehicles and trailers here involved. The sellers were not retailers and this was not a retail
sale.
2. Semi-trailers, as used by a motor carrier, are not tax-

able under the Sales Tax Act when sold in occasional or isolated transactions.

Should the court find isolated or occasional sales of motor
vehicles taxable under the Sales Tax Act, such a finding should
not include semi-trailers.
Motor vehicles as referred to under the Sales Tax Act in
Sections 59-15-2 and 59-15-5, U.C.A., are nowhere defined
under the Act. He who would interpret the meaning of "motor
vehicle" is left to interpret by analogy or common understanding. Interpretation by analogy has strong support from the
wording of the statute. Section 59-15-5 refers to "every sale
of a motor vehicle subject to registration and licensing under
the laws of this state." Reference to registration and licensing
1-t
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would logically refer one to the Motor Vehicle Act for a definition of the term "motor vehicle." Section 41-1-1, U.C.A.
defines "motor vehicle" as:
"Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained
from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon
rails."
A semi-trailer is certainly not included within this definition
of "motor vehicle." A semi-trailer is not self-propelled. Moreover, "semi-trailer" is defined in the same section as:
"Every vehicle without active power designed for
carrying persons or property and for being drawn by
a motor vehicle and so constructed that some part of
its weight and that of its load rests or is carried by
another vehicle."
It is evident that the terms "motor vehicle" and semi-trailer"
are mutually exclusive, as defined in Section 41-1-1. The term
which the legislature, had it so desired, could have used to
include both a motor vehicle and a semi-trailer would have
been "vehicle," which is defined as:
"Every device in,
property is or may
highway, excepting
or used exclusively

upon, or by which any person or
be transported or drawn upon a
devices moved by human power
upon stationary rails or tracks."

However, the legislature did not choose to use the term "vehicle." It would seem clear from this analysis that the legislature did not intend to include semi-trailers in "motor vehicles."

If the above analysis is not sufficient, recourse must be
had to the common understanding of the meaning of motor
vehicle, for the words employed in a tax statute "are to be

15
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given their ordinary meaning." (51 Am. Jur. 362 and cases
cited.)
Unquestionably, the ordinary meaning of motor vehicle
would be a vehicle with a motor. A semi-trailer certainly does
not come under such a category. It neither has a motor to
propel it nor is it part of a vehicle with a motor.
Webster's New International Dictionary does not have
a definition of "motor vehicle." Words and Phrases, Vol. 27,
at page 707, and the 1957 Cumulative Supplement at page
181 contain about a dozen cases passing on the question
whether a trailer or a semi-trailer is a motor vehicle. All of
them hold that a trailer is not a motor vehicle because it is
not propelled by a motor, and only one case is contra. This
is Department of Motor Transport vs. Motor Convoys (Ky.),
279 S. W. 2d, 815 and 816. In that case the Court was applying a tax statute on new "motor vehicles" but had another
statute which defined "motor vehicle" as "any motor propellec,l
vehicle . . . including any such vehicle operated as a unit i~
combination with other vehicles . . . "
Under either the Utah statutes or the ordinary meanings
of the words "motor vehicles" the sales tax act of Utah is not
applicable to occasional sales of trailers or semi-trailers by
persons not regularly engaged in the retail business.

3. Amendment of the definition and collection sections of
the Sales Tax Act does not alter the scope of the tax.

It is elementary that there is no imposition of a tax unless
the rate is fixed and the subject matter definitely established.
51 Am. Jur. 621; 46 A.L.R. 609, 639; South Covington Street-

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

car Company vs. Bellevue, 105 (Ky.) 283, 49 S.W. 23, 57
L.R.A. 50; People Ex Rel Seeley vs. Hall, 8 (Colo.) 485, 9
P. 34; Albion vs. Boone County, 94 (Neb.) 494, 143 N.W.
749. A grant of authority to collect a tax, where the tax had
never been imposed, would make collection of the tax unlawful. 84 C.J.S. 679; Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. vs. City of Bridgeport, 130 Atlantic 164, 103 (Conn.) 249.
In the Sales Tax Act the tax is levied or imposed by Section 59-15-4. The collection section is 59-15-5, which provides
as follows:
"The tax shall be paid by the purchaser directly to
the State Tax Commission upon every sale of a motor
vehicle subject to registration and licensing under the
laws of this state, and shall be collected by the State
Tax Commission at the time of such registration and
licensing.''
But it must be remembered that this section does not
impose the tax. And the antecedent of "the tax" is the tax
established by Section 4 of the Act.
Section 59-15-4, which is the section imposing the tax,
was not amended when the language pertaining to motor
vehicles was included by the legislature. This section still reads
in part: "From and after the effective date of this Act, there
is levied and there shall be collected and paid: (a) a tax upon
every retail sale of tangible, personal property made within
the State of Utah ... " That is the tax which the Act imposes;
and when Section 5 refers to: "The tax under the provisions
of this act," it is limited to imposition of tax on retail sales
and it thus becomes plain that although Section 5 suggests
that all sales of motor vehicles are subject to the tax, this
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careful analysis indicates that this section simply provides that
the Tax Commission and the purchaser are responsible for
collection and payment of "the tax" and no motor vehicle
subject to "the tax" is to have registration changed until that
tax has been paid.
4. An interpretation singling out motor vehicles for taxation, when sold in isolated or occasional transactions would
be unconstitutional.

It is axiomatic that a state has the power to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation.
Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co., 249 U. S. 522, 63 L.
Ed. 748. However, this power of a state to make classifications
with respect to taxation is not unlimited. An early United States
Supreme Court decision pointed out that a state legislature
has no power to select particular persons or companies to bear
the exclusive burdens of taxation. Provident lost. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611, 18 L. Ed 907.
Taxes should be levied with equality and uniformity and
in accordance with some reasonable system of apportionment,
calculated to distribute the public burden. Section 3 of Article
XIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah requires a "Uniform and equal" taxation on all tangible property in the State.
While this section refers to property, and not sales taxes, it
exemplifies the requirement for equality and uniformity in
taxation. The policy of equally distributing the public burden
applies to a sales tax as well as a property tax. The Supreme
Court of the State of Alabama has stated:
"Whilst there is no provision of the Constitution
commanding in terms and uniformity, the principle
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should underlie and regulate the provisions of every
law imposing public burdens and charges." Western
Union Tel. Co. v. State Board of Assessment, 80 (Ala.)
273, 60 Am. Rep. 99. (Reversed on other grounds in
132 U. S. 472).
Numerous cases can be cited for the general principle that
classifications in tax statutes must be reasonable, natural, and
founded upon some just and rational basis or distinction.
Classifications may not be arbitrary, oppressive, hostile, capricious, illusory or fanciful. No definite rules have been laid
down in this area. Whether a classification for tax purposes
is reasonable or arbitrary must be decided upon the facts and
circumstances appearing in each particular case.
In Winter v. Barrett, 352 (Ill.) 441, 186 N.E. 113, 89
A.L.R. 1398, the Illinois Supreme Court had before it a statute
imposing a tax upon persons engaged in the business of selling
intangible personal property at retail, which exempted from
the tax farmers selling their own produce and sellers of motor
fuel. It was argued that the seller of motor fuel could be
txcepted from the tax because an exicse tax was presently being collected for each gallon of gasoline sold. The Illinois
could held that this tax on gasoline was on the consumer as
a toll for use of the state highways, and was no basis for
excepting the seller from the questioned tax. Because there
was no valid basis for a discrimination in favor of farmers and
sellers of gasoline, the court held that the statute violated the
section of the State Constitution requiring that a tax shall be
uniform as to the class upon which it operates, and offended
against the equal protection clauses of the state and federal
constitutions (89 A.L.R. at 1412-1416). The court held that
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the tax on persons engaged in the business of selling tangible
personal property at retail was an occupation tax, as distinguished from a tax on property, or on purchasers of property.
Rather than having sales or the receipts therefrom as the
subject of the tax, the subject matter taxed was the privilege
of performing some busip.ess, while the amount of the tax
was measured in sales. This is one type of sales tax. 47 Am.
Jur. 195.
Four years later this same court had before it a statute
which imposed a tax measured by the gross receipts upon water,
gas, or electricity supplied to persons for domestic or commercial consumption ,but did not impose the tax when the
same was supplied for industrial use. Chicago v. Ames, 365
(Ill.) 529, 7 N.E. (2d) 294, 109 A.L.R. 1509 (1937). The
discrimination was held to be unreasonable, and the statute
was contrary to the uniformity clause of the State Constitution.
The discrimination involved in the administrative interpretation of the Utah sales ta~ is more readily apparent than
in either of the Illinois cases. Their reading of the Utah tax
does not merely except one or two groups from the class upon
which it operates. Their interpretation singles out one particular event, the sale of a motor vehicle, and subjects it to
a sales tax. Excepted from the tax are sales of semi-trailers,
railroad cars, refrigerators, engines, farm tractors and many
similar items which are within the same class of isolated or
occasional sales. There is no reasonable basis for the taxing
of isolated sales of motor vehicles and not occasional sales
of other similar property. A state does not have this power to
select particular persons or companies to bear the exclusive
burdens of taxation. Provident Inst. v. Massacl1usetts, supra.
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The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to state tax legislation. Ohio Oil Co. v.
Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 75 L. ed 775, 50 S. Ct. 310; Louisville
Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 72 L. ed 770, 48 S.
Ct. 423. In American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.
S. 89, 21 S. Ct. 43, 45 L. Ed. 102, the Supreme Court of the
United States had under consideration a statute of the State
of Louisiana imposing a tax on the business of refining sugar
<..nd molasses. The amount of the tax was based on gross annual
receipts. The statute provided it should not apply to planters
and farmers grinding and refining their own sugar and molasses. This exemption was held valid, in that it did not deny
equal protection of the laws to persons and corporations
engaged in a general refining business. The Supreme Court
stated:
"The act in question does undoubtedly discriminate
in favor of a certain class of refiners, but this discrimination, if founded upon a reasonable distinction in
principle, is valid. Of course, if such discriminaton were
purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, and made
to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations, or other considerations having no possible connection with the
duties of citizens as taxpayers, such exemption would
be pure favoritism, and a denial of the equal protection
of the laws to the less favored classes."
The court found there was a reasonable distinction between
the refiners who were taxed and the producers who were not
taxed.
In Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 77 L. ed.
929, 53 S. Ct. 481, 85 A.L.R. 699 (1933), the court held a
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tax statute violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment where the classification was found to be without
reasonable basis. The statute required a license to be obtained
for the operation of a store, and imposed a greater tax per
store where stores are located in more than one county than
where they are all in the same county. The court was unable
to discover any reasonable basis for this classification, in that
an increase in the tax not only on a new store but on all the
old stores, consequent upon the mere physical fact that the
new one lies a few feet over a county line, finds no foundation
in reason or in any fact of business experience.
Ohio Oil Co. v. Wright, 53 N.E. 2d 966, says in headnote
14, "The designation of persons composing a class subject to
tax may not be arbitrary or capricious and uniformity may be
violated by including those in fact not within the class, as well
as by excluding those properly within it." This statement seems
to apply to the case here, and excluding from the tax all sales
of an isolated or occasional nature by persons not regularly
engaged in retail selling, and then making a general exception
for motor vehicles only seems arbitrary and capricious.
In Transport Manufacturing Equipment Co. v. Bates, 224
S.W. 2d, 996, it is held that a statute imposing a use tax on
motor vehicles, but exempting motor vehicles having a seating
capacity of ten passengers or more, is void as violating constituional provision that a tax shall be uniform on the same
class of subjects.
Likewise, an increased rate of tax on department stores,
which would not be applicable to stores carrying the same
merchandise but not segregating it into departments, was held
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invalid for lack of a reasonable basis for distinction. Barker
Bros. v. City of Los Angeles, 76 P. 2d 97.
A statute requiring sanitation of buildings occupied by
bread, biscuit and cake bakeries, but exempting from its operation buildings of pie, pastry and cracker bakeries is unconstitutional as being discriminatory between members of vutually the same class. State v. Miksicels, 125 S.W. 507.
It is important that the State raise revenues; but it must
be done with equality and non-discrimination as the standard.
For the legislature to have singled out occasional sales of motor
vehicles as subject to the tax, and have it apply otherwise only
to sales made by persons regularly engaged in an organized
retail selling business is discriminatory and therefore invalid.
The imposition of the tax must be limited to persons engaged
in such regular retail business.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The amendment of the Sales Tax Act by the 1949 legislature was awkward and ambiguous and involved poor draftsmanship. It shifted the collection burden from retailers (except
registered automobile dealers) to the State Tax Commission
and used the need for registration as the means of collecting
the tax. This tended to expand the incidence of the tax since
it placed upon the purchaser the burden of convincing the State
Tax Commission that the vehicle involved had not been purchased through a retailer or a regularly licensed automobile
dealer. The practical effect of this has apparently become
insistence on payment of the tax by all purchasers whether
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arising from an isolated or occasional sale or not. But since the
legislature did not expand the definition of retailer or change
the incidence of the tax from one upon retail sale or sale by a
retailer, it is plain under the statute that the only isolated
or occasional sales of motor vehicles subject to the sales tax
are those sold by regular retailers.
The reference in the amendment to the motor vehicle registration laws compel this court, in the construction of the
statute, to go to the motor vehicle laws for a definition of
motor vehicle. These definitions plainly exclude trailers and
5emi-trailers from the Sales Tax Act.
The appellant is entitled to the benefit of strict construction
in the application of this revenue measure which includes the
construction that since the section levying the tax was not
amended the legislature must be held not to have intended to
change the tax levy or the imposition of the tax and simply
to clarify the handling of motor vehicle sales when made by
retailers.
The foregoing constructions are all confirmed by the
doubtful constitutionality of a tax law which would single out
of many similar transactions and sales of many comparable
commodities the sales only of motor vehicles. The singling
out of sales of one commodity for taxation is a clear denial
of the equal protection of the laws.
This court should hold that the Sales Tax Act applies
to sales of motor vehicles when made by persons regularly
engaged in the selling of motor vehicles or other commodities
but has no application to those isolated and occasional trans-
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actions which occur when a person not engaged in business
or one engaged in a business other than regular selling of
commodities chooses to transfer title to a motor vehicle.
Respectfully submitted,
A. S. GLIKBARG
15 5 Sansome Street
San Francisco, California
RICHARDS and BIRD
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Appellant
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